This symposium examines the interplay between linguistic and non-linguistic cognition. While some cognitive functions appear to depend on language, others seem rather independent of it and many more integrate both aspects. In psychology, however, the distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic cognition is rarely made explicitly and there is currently no consensus on how language may shape, enable or constrain thought.

The symposium brings together perspectives from cognitive research, developmental psychology and animal cognition to address three questions:

(1) How are language and thought related?
(2) Which cognitive functions are inherently linguistic, and which are not?
(3) To what extend can language modulate domains traditionally considered non-linguistic?

Part 1 brings together comparative and ontogenetic perspectives, focusing on animal cognition and human development. Lena Veit will speak about vocal communication in birds. Marlen Fröhlich's contribution deals with pragmatic inference abilities in orangutans. Paul Gallenkemper studies expectation formation in conceptual and non-conceptual contexts. Krisztina Orban looks at pointing in human and non-human primates as well as from a development perspective, concluding that pointing is a proto-linguistic behavior bridging the gap between non-linguistic behavior and fully developed language. Claudio Tennie discusses the hypothesis that human culture requires language and language in turn requires know-how copying abilities, that are nearly or completely absent in non-human apes.

Part 2 adopts a cognitive psychology perspective (see detailed description there).