This talk explores the idea that pointing is a proto-linguistic communicative act, bridging the gap between non-linguistic behavior and fully developed language. Building on work by Tomasello (2010), Planer and Sterelny (2021), and others, it argues that pointing is not merely a precursor to language but a fundamental tool with symbolic, indicative, and iconic properties. Evidence from infant development, sign languages, and homesign systems shows that pointing carries illocutionary force, supports referential communication, and functions similarly to linguistic demonstratives. Human pointing differs fundamentally from that of non-human primates, requiring more advanced cognitive and social capacities. The talk analyzes distinctions between showing, begging, and pointing, arguing that pointing is referring and reference-fixing. Importantly, pointing is used not only for communication but also for thinking—for example, as a tool for counting, organizing information, or aiding memory. Its symbolic and arbitrary nature, combined with universal interpretability and ease of production, makes it a uniquely human behavior. Pointing likely evolved to meet the need for flexible referring to a wide range of objects, supporting infinite expressibility in terms of referring (yet semantic recursion). We argue that pointing allows some compositionality, but not like language. Pointing has some essential features of language but less developed than in language. Ultimately, pointing exemplifies the transition from perceptually driven indicators to intentional communication and cognition, positioning it as a proto-linguistic behavior foundational to language evolution. Pointing likely evolved as a hybrid with primitive sound production which allows the transition to language.