This paper studies the drivers of financial sector change in resource-rich authoritarian countries. Existing studies assume that political leaders of these countries are disinterested in advancing financial markets and that the resource wealth that these politicians have at their disposal allows them to act to the detriment of the financial sector without consequences. This paper challenges such a view. It argues that political leaders of resource-rich and authoritarian countries also need the necessary political support to be able to maintain power. To entertain political supporters, political leaders in turn must ensure a level of economic performance acceptable to its supporters and for this, the financial sector is pivotal. It follows from this that if economic performance is no longer satisfactory to political supporters, financial sector change follows. The paper substantiates the argument by drawing on the case study of oil-rich Angola, highlighting the significant changes that have taken place in the country’s financial sector since the country's independence in 1975. Through a careful tracing of the causal processes underpinning these changes, the paper finds that contrary to expectations of existing literature, Angolan political leaders have promoted financial sector change in their bid to maintain political control and have done so successfully. The findings from the Angolan case therefore encourages us to rethink the role of financial sectors in resource-rich authoritarian countries.