Existing literature on parties and coalitions in Africa is undergirded by the assumption that most political parties mobilize on ethnic grounds and thus that electoral coordination is difficult to achieve as supposed inter-ethnic antagonisms hinder cooperation. This paper will address this, contextualizing the interplay between ethnicity and coalition formation, it will argue that the evidence suggests that ethnically-based parties are more likely to be able to negotiate and sustain pre-electoral coalitions. An analysis of such negotiations in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Uganda from 2000-2016 suggests that when parties in coalitions compete for the same constituencies at parliamentary and local levels, it induces greater levels of internal dissent, fomenting intra-party instability and leadership challenges. Party leaders then approach coalition negotiations more cynically, limiting the likelihood of reaching the compromises necessary for coordination. By contrast, ‘ethnic’ parties in coalition are less likely to compete for the same voters, allowing party leaders to maintain their bases and more easily subvert challenges from within the party. This suggests that rather than ethnicity being a hindrance to coalitions, it may be a help.