How do subnational authorities appeal to their constituents? Much of the literature on sub-Saharan African emphasizes the role of neo-patrimonial logics of material reciprocity and ethnic belonging. Drawing on nine months of research in northern Uganda, this paper proposes an explanation for why morality—and other values-based logics—may take a back seat to material- or identity-based logics. The paper uses two cases involving political authorities, one in Pader and the other in Amuru, two districts in Acholi sub-region, northern Uganda. These cases reveal how Uganda’s institutional structure paired with violent state interventions stymie the efforts of aspiring politicians to consolidate loyal constituencies. Instead, the central state’s direct, arbitrary, and violent interventions against politicians and their constituents serve as a public demonstration of the comparative weakness of sub-national political authorities in relation to the central state and ruling party. In turn, this leads to the easy interpretation that politicians who survive or thrive in this political environment are complicit with the interests of the ruling regime, making citizens suspicious of those who claim to act in good faith. Unsubstantiated rumors further fuel this skepticism: tales of state-organized assassinations circulate when public figures die unexpectedly; allegations of bribery proliferate when politicians support the ruling party’s policies. However, producing suspicion without evidence allows politicians to maintain the possibility—however slight—that they could act in their constituents’ interests. In turn, this keeps many citizens marginally engaged with the democratic process while limiting the space for a politics based on authentically moral grounds.