The practice of begging for alms is widespread among talibés (child students of the Qur’an) in daaras (traditional Qur’anic schools, often boarding schools) in urban Senegal and has been the target of various government initiatives as well as many international NGO programmes that often frame the practice as a violation of children’s rights.
Based on semi-structured interviews currently being undertaken (September 2017 - July 2018) with representatives of NGOs, international institutions and local associations, representatives of state structures, Qur’anic teachers and religious leaders in Senegal, this paper will explore how different actors involved in the sectors of child protection and Qur’anic education navigate the paradoxical understandings of talibé begging. It will argue that many of these actors strategically employ a shared discourse of “yes to daaras, no to begging” despite their different and sometimes contradictory motives, meaning the discourse is unlikely to lead to consensus and change in practice.
Many current NGO/government efforts to protect talibés focus on differentiating begging in its current form from the concept of alms-seeking as a means to teach religious values such as humility, thus framing the practice as a corruption of a once beneficial tradition. Begging today is instead described either as child trafficking and exploitation or as a consequence of poverty and rapid urban migration. However, the extent to which this traditional versus modern dichotomy is historically accurate has been called into question in the literature. At the same time, the talibés’ begging can also be understood as a convenient method for urban Senegalese Muslims to give daily alms, and previous short-lived attempts to apply laws banning Qur’anic teachers from sending children to beg have led to backlash among the population. This suggests that the practice of begging even in its modern form is not entirely separate from religion in the minds of the urban population.
For development NGOs, associations and government, decoupling the practice of begging from Qur’anic education serves several purposes. Adopting this discourse can provide a means for these actors to distance themselves and their current interventions from colonial attempts to control, repress or infiltrate the daaras; to engender collaboration with the Qur’anic teachers who run the daaras; and to avoid political confrontation with powerful Sufi brotherhoods while being seen to be taking action in the eyes of the international community. On the other hand, the same actors have different objectives and visions for the future of daaras in Senegal, ranging from prosecuting all teachers who send their students to beg, to sending children back to their parents, or cutting down the amount of time spent begging so that children can concentrate on memorising the Qur’an.
This paper will therefore argue that while saying “yes to daaras, no to begging” on the surface suggests a unified approach to protecting talibés, it is only masking deeper disagreements which will continue to prevent large scale change in the daara system from taking place.