This paper critically explores the concept of a ‘democratic dividend’, the notion that democratization leads to socio-economic benefits for the mass of the population. It focuses on the case of Ghana, where successful democratic consolidation is evident, and where previous studies have argued that democratization has delivered public goods to the poor. Yet such studies tend to ignore three significant problems that have accompanied democratization – rising inequalities, increased corruption, and a relative neglect of the quality of basic services – all of which undermine the notion of a democratic dividend as directly benefitting the mass of low-income and no income people. While overall poverty levels have reduced in Ghana, income inequalities have consistently risen since the return to multiparty democracy in 1992, not least as much of public resources are captured by elites in society. We argue that democratic competition has also contributed to the growing problem of corruption, notably through kickbacks for party financing, as well as to the delivery of poor quality services. Due to growing electoral competition, politicians have demonstrated greater commitment towards the provision of education and health infrastructure (because of their visibility and related political capital) but without commensurate efforts to improving the quality of services. The Ghanaian case clearly suggests that not all good things necessarily go together: while democratic freedoms should be promoted in their own right, the instrumental expectations associated with democratization are often misplaced, most notably where liberal democratic rule is subject to elite domination.