16:00 - 17:30
Room: Muirhead – Lecture Theatre – G15
Stream: The Politics of Development in Africa
Informal Institutions, Interests and Bypasses in Malawi’s Development Aid Landscape: Political Economy Perspective
Michael Chasukwa
University of Leeds, Leeds
University of Malawi, Zomba

Several development aid policies such as Paris Declaration, Accra Agenda for Action and Busan Partnership recommend using national institutions and procedures to manage and deliver aid. These development policies aim at enhancing aid effectiveness, building capacity within national institutions and control aid proliferation. Despite development partners and aid-receiving countries agreeing on using national institutions to deliver aid, reports indicate that much of aid is still delivered through bypass arrangements. Concerns about corruption and weak implementing capacity in developing countries that negatively affect attainment of the intended results have facilitated usage of bypass arrangements. Based on primary empirical data collected through qualitative research design, the paper examines how multilateral and bilateral development agencies bypass government machinery to channel aid to rural communities in Malawi - a third world country in Southern Africa. Set in the context of Malawi’s Local Development Fund, the paper establishes that project management units, earmarked funds and specialized procurement arrangements are some of mechanisms used to circumvent public machinery in delivery development aid. In addition, the paper establishes that bypass arrangements weaken further the capacity of developing countries to formulate and implement their own development policies. Using political economy theoretical framework, the paper argues that whilst bypass arrangements achieve short-term gains displaying successful ‘donorship,’ long-term gains are hampered by institutional void and competition among actors associated with most of bypass mechanisms of aid delivery. The paper also argues that informal rules of the game dominate over formal institutions when it comes to delivering aid at national and community level because of clientelism networks and logics of patrimonialism. The paper holds the view that donors’ pursuit for different interests in Local Development Fund weakens their position and efforts to stamp out aid fungibility through patronage and clientelism. Furthermore, the paper conclude that bypasses increase aid fragmentation and fall outside preferred aid modalities of Malawi government since, among other reasons, weaken domestic institutions and public machinery.


Reference:
Tu-A50 Politics of Development 5-P-001
Presenter/s:
Michael Chasukwa
Presentation type:
Panel
Room:
Muirhead – Lecture Theatre – G15
Date:
Tuesday, 11 September
Time:
16:00 - 16:15
Session times:
16:00 - 17:30