Since 1955 and the Bandung conference, nuclear disarmament had became an important element in the Third World and African countries international agenda. Strictly connected with the evaluation of risks involved in the nuclear military technology, but also with the pursuit of the continent’s liberation from external influences (military bases and nuclear tests), disarmament of Africa in the nuclear field was not only reaffirmed by the Organisation of the African unity or the Cairo conference in 1964. It had also been endorsed by the UN General Assembly resolutions. Following the resolution 1651(XVI), the Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa adopted in December 1965 “reaffirmed its call upon states to respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear free-zone”. Despite their clear commitment to the non-proliferation and global disarmament, African countries have also regularly expressed their criticism of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) opened for signature in 1968. A number of them, especially the Front line states, especially Zambia, became party of the treaty only in 1991 when the independence of Namibia became effective, the negotiation process started in South Africa and Pretoria committed itself to sign the NPT as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State. The aim of this presentation will be to analyse this opposition as a strategy used by the African actors to achieve two important goals: to obtain support from superpowers for the peace process in Southern Africa, but also to broaden the scope of the treaty itself as the dismantlement of the South African programme provided security guarantees in the region and paved the way for the full denuclearisation of Africa (Pelindaba treaty).