This paper examines the politics of French involvement in Chad’s civil wars from 1969 to 1982. The period saw two major French military interventions, the collapse of the Chadian state, a Libyan military occupation, and the rise to power of Hissène Habré, one of the most brutal dictators in the history of postcolonial Africa. Based on newly declassified archival sources, the paper will critically analyze the evolution of French engagement in Chad through two prisms: the history of French security policy, and the local and regional political context of the Chadian civil war.
Principally, the paper will argue that despite their overwhelming military capabilities and economic presence in Chad, local and regional political dynamics severely limited the French capacity to influence events. This capacity also substantially declined over time. By 1980, and notwithstanding the presence of a major intervention force, French policymakers had no effective control over Chad’s politics. Partly this stemmed from a lack of consensus among French policymakers about how to stabilize the country. It also related to the ways in which the combined and conflicting interests of states bordering Chad, particularly Libya and Nigeria, made it difficult for French diplomacy to benefit from its “traditional” francophone African allies in support of French objectives. Chad’s political divisions and the limited authority of its central government also greatly complicated French ambitions. This translated into changing French attitudes towards different factions in the country’s conflicts. Such a policy often lacked coherence and clearly elaborated goals. This incoherence and changes in the character and nature of French commitment in Chad over time also contributed to the eventual collapse of the Chadian state and helped to reinforce the country’s political fragmentation.