11:00 - 12:30
Parallel sessions 2
11:00 - 12:30
Room: HSZ - N9
Chair/s:
Maren Mayer, Tobias Rebholz
Beyond the more traditional paradigm of advice taking, which is at the center of the symposium “New advances in advice taking research: Cognitive, social, and algorithmic perspectives”, this symposium highlights paradigms and cases in which dependency among individuals is less structured. In five talks, we present and discuss evidence from paradigms featuring dependent judgments and belief updating and highlight how others influence individuals’ judgments and beliefs in various ways.

The first contribution highlights how planned missing data designs can help us measure belief updating when no initial judgment is elicited. The second contribution draws on sequential collaboration, a method for aggregating estimates that does not include initial judgments, and examines whether contributors are influenced by social information about others. The third contribution investigates how framing and repetition of information systematically influence not only subjective truth judgments but also confidence, which in turn has been associated with reduced information seeking. In the fourth contribution, belief updating to scientific hypotheses is compared under different ordering and under either sequential or simultaneous presentation of evidence. Finally, the last contribution examines how trust in science shapes individuals’ belief updating for scientific evidence considering both source expertise and ambiguity of evidence.
Submission 236
Sourcing and Belief Updating in Individuals Exposed to Scientific Evidence: A Psychological Perspective
SymposiumTalk-05
Presented by: Tom Rosman
Tom Rosman
Leibniz Institute for Psychology (ZPID), Germany
Trust in science is essential for the adoption of science-based advice, as it supports belief updating grounded in empirical evidence. Yet, little is known about the psychological mechanisms and boundary conditions under which trust in science promotes individual belief updating. The present research reports a preregistered experimental study (N = 1,305; general population) examining how trust in science interacts with source expertise and evidence direction to shape belief updating in the domain of acupuncture. Using a mixed 2x2x2 design, participants first reported their initial acupuncture-related beliefs and were then presented with scientific evidence—in the form of four brief study summaries—that was either conclusive or diverging (i.e., evidence direction factor; between-subjects). In addition, this evidence was attributed to either high-expertise or low-expertise scientists (expertise factor; between-subjects), experimentally manipulated via author descriptions. Beliefs were assessed a second time following the manipulation (within-subjects factor). Results showed that evidence attributed to high-expertise scientists elicited stronger belief updating than evidence from low-expertise scientists. Moreover, trust in science played a moderating role depending on expertise and evidence direction: Compared to all other groups, individuals with higher trust in science updated their beliefs more strongly when the evidence was conclusive and came from high-expertise scientists. In contrast, when these credibility cues were weak, trust in science did not promote belief updating. These findings suggest that trust in science supports an adaptive pattern of information processing: It facilitates belief change in response to credible evidence while guarding against uncritical acceptance of inconclusive information from unreliable sources.