Being able to reflect on one’s own performance is an important determinant of task success. In the field of metacognition, such metacognitive monitoring processes have been studied via judgments provided by participants. Accurate metacognitive monitoring may be especially important in challenging contexts, such as those requiring the resolution of cognitive conflict. In so-called conflict tasks, participants attend to relevant information while ignoring irrelevant information. When the relevant and irrelevant information prompt different responses, cognitive control is required to respond correctly. Many theories of cognitive control assume the existence of a conflict monitoring mechanism which detects conflicts and alerts the system to upregulate the relevant and downregulate the irrelevant information (Botvinick et al. 2001). Evidence for this comes from the observation that conflict processing is affected by previously experienced conflict. However, it remains unknown whether the rather unconscious, automatic conflict monitoring thought to occur in conflict tasks is related to the conscious, reportable monitoring studied in metacognitive studies. Here we aimed to directly investigate this link across development. Two groups of children and an adult group completed a metacognitive version of the animal Stroop task (Bryce et al. 2011). After responding to each trial, participants gave an explicit metacognitive judgment of their reaction time (RT). Preliminary results indicate significant conflict adaptation effects in children’s RTs and rather accurate metacognitive monitoring in both groups of children. Only the congruency effect and not conflict adaptation effects are reflected in children’s estimated RTs, suggesting children are not fully aware of their cognitive control abilities.