A bulk of empirical evidence shows that episodic memory is susceptible to social influence. This influence can be exerted not only intentionally by social agents; it can also emerge incidentally in interpersonal interaction and communication, without any intention or explicit awareness of the participating actors. We argue that such memory biases are often the joint product of cognitive processes and people’s needs and motives. For this purpose, we present recent empirical results from the so-called „saying-is-believing“ (SIB) paradigm, in which episodic memory retrieval of a communicator is biased in the service of shared reality creation with his/her audience. In this experimental paradigm, a communicator first reads a text describing ambiguous behaviors of a target person (called Michael) and then describes this person in a personal message to an audience, after having learned that this audience knows Michael and either likes him or does not like him. Finally, the communicator is asked to recall the original text about Michael. The critical finding is that not only the communicator’s message valence is biased towards the audience attitude, but – more importantly – also his/her individual episodic memory of the original information about the target person. The memory effect does not occur when a biased message is produced due to other motives than shared reality creation (e.g., financial incentives). Our most recent findings show, by including a newly developed speeded reaction time task, that the memory bias is cognitively rooted in enhanced accessibility of audience-congruent information about the target.