Missing Evidence for Implicit Recognition: The Indirect Task Advantage in Contextual Cueing
Wed-HS1-Talk VII-01
Presented by: Sascha Meyen
Studies on unconscious or implicit cognitive capacities often rely on a problematic standard reasoning. For example, in the contextual cueing paradigm, evidence for implicit memory is inferred from a pattern of two results: First, repeated stimulus configurations produce faster mean reaction times (RT) than new ones. Second, when participants are asked directly to discriminate repeated vs. new stimulus configurations, their explicit recognition sensitivity is close to chance. Researchers routinely infer that the recognition sensitivity driving RT effects is larger than the sensitivity of explicit responses—a situation we call Indirect Task Advantage (ITA). Based on this ITA, researchers infer recognition that goes beyond participants’ explicit memory, that is, implicit recognition. The problem with this standard reasoning: Sensitivities underlying RT effects are never calculated. An appropriate analysis to establish an ITA is the sensitivity comparison in which sensitivities from the RT data are computed and compared against explicit recognition sensitivity. In a preregistered reanalysis, we apply this appropriate method to 20 studies in the contextual cueing paradigm and find no evidence for ITAs. Thus, the empirical basis for claims about implicit recognition is lacking and interpretations in this paradigm—but likely also in others using the standard reasoning—require serious reevaluation.
Keywords: implicit memory, contextual cueing, indirect task advantage