Flood Defence – A social dilemma for the future
Wed-B17-Talk VI-04
Presented by: Adrián Fehér
Existing social dilemma paradigms gave us a good understanding of some aspects of human behaviour in specific social situations, however, they are somewhat limited in their ecological validity and applicability. With this in mind, we developed a social dilemma paradigm, called Flood Defence, which simulates not only the individuals’ relations to their own group but also their relations to an outside group, as well as the dynamics between the two groups. In the game, two villages (four people each) – blue and red – must work together to protect themselves against the incoming flood, saving just their own or both villages, while they have the option to be greedy with their resources. Across multiple studies, we discovered that (a) high in-game reward for cooperation urges subclinical psychopaths to disregard the between-group conflict – caused by the different house colours – and cooperate with the out-group (N=116), while (b) immediate monetary compensation (which is dependent on the in-game successfulness) makes participants with higher reward-sensitivity in the BAS system opt for the most optimal strategy (N=44). When (c) anonymity was lifted, male participants were prioritizing their own group, even at the expense of in-game success (N=48). We also found that (d) changing the colours of the houses from blue and red to a homogenous grey can significantly increase cooperation with the out-group (N=383). As most aspects of the game can be adjusted/controlled/manipulated, it can be utilized in various research paradigms where intra- and intergroup relations are important to consider.
Keywords: social dilemma, cooperation, dark triad, BIS/BAS