There are multiple examples of episodic information contributing to judgments concerning semantic memory. For example, in the illusory truth effect participants are misled by fluency resulting from episodic processing into believing more confidently that certain statements are true. But do recollections of specific episodic events also affect assessments of one’s semantic memory? Here we assessed this issue by comparing the effects of reinstating the encoding context at the time of retrieval – a manipulation facilitating retrieval of specific episodes of previous study – on metacognitive judgments accompanying both episodic and semantic memory tasks. Participants studied verbal materials presented against contextual background photographs and were later asked either to recognize words that were studied or to recognize synonyms and antonyms of these studied words. In Experiment 1, prospective metacognition in the form of feeling of knowing judgments was examined. Experiment 2 examined retrospective metacognition in the form of confidence judgments. In both experiments, reinstating encoding context at the time of retrieval robustly affected metacognitive judgments in the episodic memory tasks, but had no discernible effect on metacognitive judgments in the semantic memory tasks. Thus, while people may become confused by episodically-induced fluency when retrieving information from semantic memory, they seem capable of separating episodic recollection from the appraisal of semantic retrieval.