Does the family-name trump merit in the appointment process of judges? To ensure that applicants are selected on a merit base some countries have implemented nonpartisan selection commissions. However, especially in countries shaped by clientelism and patronage the selection of judges may still be driven by factors other than qualification. I argue that in these contexts the selection commission and the prevalent inclusion of the executive remain weak points in the appointment process. Using the case of the Philippines, I expound that the selection commission is a constant target for lobbying by influential groups in the society. Similarly, the president likely uses his remaining influence on the appointment to provide friends and elites with prestigious positions in the judicial branch. Thereby, applicants’ relationship to one of the many local influential family clans plays a major role for the prospects in the selection process. I test this argument using an original dataset on applicants at various levels of the nomination process for the position as judge at lower and mid-level courts in the Philippines between 2015 and 2019. Preliminary results provide evidence for an advantage of applicants with a relationship to a local influential family. Furthermore, the analyses show that those applicants that are less selective regarding their prospective position have a higher chance of getting appointed.