Transparency in workplaces does not merely mean information-sharing; instead, it is a collective good that constrains abusive and unfair workplace practices. Yet, transparency only exists if individuals disclose sensitive information. Prior research shows that disclosure is costly, carrying risks both personal and professional. This study asks who can afford these costs and is therefore, positioned to enforce transparency norms in the workplace.

We propose that disclosure depends on the type of information being shared and the risks it poses to the discloser’s social position. Drawing on expectation states theory, we predict that these risks are structured by relative status within the dyad of the person who discloses and their confidant. Lower-status actors face heightened costs when disclosing upward, whereas higher-status actors can disclose more freely across equal- and lower-status relationships. These dynamics can vary by information type: disclosing an event of bullying entails vulnerability and acknowledgment of victimization, while pay disclosure signals competence and organizational value.

We draw on an original survey experiment conducted with 4,706 employees in the United States. Respondents were presented with two workplace scenarios. One scenario asked participants to imagine themselves as the target of workplace bullying and gave them the opportunity to disclose the experience to a coworker. The second scenario asked whether they would disclose their pay to a coworker who expressed concern about pay fairness. The experiment employed a 2 (respondent gender: Female/Male) × 2 (respondent race: Black/White) × 2 (coworker gender) × 2 (coworker race) factorial design, allowing us to examine disclosure across a full set of relational contexts.

Using binary logistic regression models, we find that both bullying disclosure and pay disclosure are structured by relative status within the dyad. Disclosure is most likely to flow from higher-status actors—who are culturally perceived as more competent in workplace settings—to lower-status actors, who are more burdened with proving competence. Disclosure is less common among equal-status actors and least likely when lower-status actors (e.g., women and Black workers) disclose upward to higher-status coworkers. These patterns highlight that transparency, while collectively beneficial, is unevenly produced in practice. Policies promoting workplace transparency thus risk reproducing inequality by placing disproportionate disclosure costs on lower-status workers in everyday interactions.