This paper examines how social norms shape anti-coordination behavior under asymmetric income distributions. We study two three-player games: the classic Volunteer’s Dilemma, where multiple players can benefit, and a novel Deserver’s Dilemma, where rewards are scarce and exclusive. Using a controlled experiment, we elicit normative expectations conditional on endowment differences and assess their influence on strategic choices. In the Volunteer’s Dilemma, less-endowed individuals are more likely to pursue the high payoff, while richer individuals tend to sacrifice when group composition makes them focal. In contrast, endowment heterogeneity does not affect behavior in the Deserver’s Dilemma, where scarcity shifts attention from shared responsibility to individual competition. Norm compliance strengthens when conformity entails low individual risk but weakens under concentrated rewards. These findings highlight how structural features of interaction—such as payoff asymmetries and reward scarcity—shape the effectiveness of social norms as coordination devices.