Submission 17
Convincing Works Councils to Use Digital Monitoring at Work? Perspectives and Negotiations of Managers and Works Council Members in Germany
P4-G08-03
Presented by: Luisa Wieser
The rapid digitalization of workplace technologies, especially digital surveillance tools, raises critical questions about negotiation dynamics between works councils and management. Driven by rapid advancements in information and communication technologies, employers now have unprecedented capabilities to monitor and track employee activities in real time. These monitoring technologies promise to enhance productivity, ensure compliance, and safeguard company assets. However, they also raise significant ethical and legal concerns, particularly regarding employee privacy and autonomy.
Multiple actors are participating in the negotiation process about digital monitoring technologies, bringing distinct interests and objectives to the table. Within establishments, employee representation bodies – like works councils – counterbalance the management's desire to implement surveillance technologies by negotiating the terms and conditions under which such technologies can be used. Especially in countries like Germany – where works councils hold significant power (e.g., co-determination rights, veto rights etc.) – they can influence whether and how digital surveillance technologies are implemented and/or used.
Our research investigates the perspectives of both – managers (leaders) and subordinates (represented by works councils) – in the German context, focusing on their willingness to accept digital monitoring under varying conditions of purpose, data access, and compensation. Using a factorial survey design, we analyze responses from 240 employees in the machine and vehicle construction industry in Germany. The sample holds observations of 105 works council members drawn from a commercial address database. To shed light on the employers’ perspective (managers/leaders), we analyze complementary surveys from 135 managers to mirror the employee perspective (works councils). The selection criteria of the target group (managers/leaders) were ensured by using a commercial access panel provider (Norstat) to recruit employees with personnel responsibilities. For both groups, the online survey is composed of (the same) hypothetical scenarios (vignettes) and further work-related and demographic questions. The vignette experiment includes respondents’ evaluation of workplace conditions with a given monitoring technology and their estimation to reach a monitoring agreement between management and the works council. Subsequently, respondents had to rate the likelihood and evaluation of a monitoring agreement if there was no initial agreement but subordinates would now receive a certain compensation for being monitored (agreement incentive). Conducting our data with a factorial survey experiment, we aimed to mimic negotiation scenarios between works councils and management regarding decisions about employee monitoring technologies.
Our results indicate shared scepticism towards surveillance – with managers being only moderately interested and works councils rating the monitoring as rather problematic. However, the monitoring concerns decrease if monitoring focuses on security aspects (data use, workplace safety). Further, works councils are more receptive to digital monitoring if the monitoring data is shared more transparently (with them). Surprisingly, works councils remain resistant to compensatory offers. Managers, on the other hand, perceive (monetary) compensation as an effective tool to achieve a monitoring agreement with works councils. These findings underscore the intricate dynamics of workplace negotiations, offering insights into barriers and pathways for technological adoption.
Multiple actors are participating in the negotiation process about digital monitoring technologies, bringing distinct interests and objectives to the table. Within establishments, employee representation bodies – like works councils – counterbalance the management's desire to implement surveillance technologies by negotiating the terms and conditions under which such technologies can be used. Especially in countries like Germany – where works councils hold significant power (e.g., co-determination rights, veto rights etc.) – they can influence whether and how digital surveillance technologies are implemented and/or used.
Our research investigates the perspectives of both – managers (leaders) and subordinates (represented by works councils) – in the German context, focusing on their willingness to accept digital monitoring under varying conditions of purpose, data access, and compensation. Using a factorial survey design, we analyze responses from 240 employees in the machine and vehicle construction industry in Germany. The sample holds observations of 105 works council members drawn from a commercial address database. To shed light on the employers’ perspective (managers/leaders), we analyze complementary surveys from 135 managers to mirror the employee perspective (works councils). The selection criteria of the target group (managers/leaders) were ensured by using a commercial access panel provider (Norstat) to recruit employees with personnel responsibilities. For both groups, the online survey is composed of (the same) hypothetical scenarios (vignettes) and further work-related and demographic questions. The vignette experiment includes respondents’ evaluation of workplace conditions with a given monitoring technology and their estimation to reach a monitoring agreement between management and the works council. Subsequently, respondents had to rate the likelihood and evaluation of a monitoring agreement if there was no initial agreement but subordinates would now receive a certain compensation for being monitored (agreement incentive). Conducting our data with a factorial survey experiment, we aimed to mimic negotiation scenarios between works councils and management regarding decisions about employee monitoring technologies.
Our results indicate shared scepticism towards surveillance – with managers being only moderately interested and works councils rating the monitoring as rather problematic. However, the monitoring concerns decrease if monitoring focuses on security aspects (data use, workplace safety). Further, works councils are more receptive to digital monitoring if the monitoring data is shared more transparently (with them). Surprisingly, works councils remain resistant to compensatory offers. Managers, on the other hand, perceive (monetary) compensation as an effective tool to achieve a monitoring agreement with works councils. These findings underscore the intricate dynamics of workplace negotiations, offering insights into barriers and pathways for technological adoption.