Work environments are – besides a place to earn one’s living in return for labor – also social settings that are characterized by employment relationships and, thus, social interactions that entail norms about (in)appropriate behaviors. Accordingly, workplaces are affected by phenomena as the proceeding digitalisation on an occupational and a social dimension. Digital monitoring technologies for example grant the chance of detecting workplace misconduct but also elevate perceptions of privacy invasion. Yet, the normative consequences of digital monitoring remain to be explored. Hence, we aim to investigate a) if the implementation of digital workplace monitoring is perceived to be acceptable, b) how proposals to implement them are perceived, and c) how norm violations regarding the implementation of digital workplace monitoring are dealt with.
To do so, we conducted two experimental factorial survey experiments which confronted the respondents with a possible implementation of digital monitoring by the firm’s management. Firstly, the hypothetical situations varied by type of the monitoring system and its derived consequences. Subsequently, participants were told that the team disapproved of the proposed implementation of the monitoring system. Secondly, in study 1 (N=904) we investigated how a colleague’s violation against the team’s digital monitoring norm is evaluated regarding the violation severity and expected consequences (social sanctions). In study 2 (N=1003), we looked at respondents’ reactions regarding the violation severity and expected consequences (social sanctions) if the norm violator was the team’s leader. Here, the narrative was presented from an ego-perspective (respondent as norm-violating leader) or an outer-perspective (respondent is a subordinate of the norm-violating leader). Both studies surveyed employees in Germany being recruited via online convenience panels.
Our results indicate partially shared attitudes regarding monitoring technology. Independent of the respondent’s or the norm violator’s leadership status, monitoring in the form of video tracking was evaluated as less acceptable compared to screen tracking. However, the monitoring purpose (proficiency monitoring vs task coordination) does not seem to contribute to the acceptability evaluation of digital monitoring technologies. In Study 1, results indicated a perception of betrayal amongst employees if a colleague violated the prevalent monitoring norm. Yet, leaders seem to be indifferent to the norm violation of a team member. Contrary, respondents with personnel responsibilities showed a greater aversion to violating the given monitoring norm in Study 2 (compared to subordinated employees). Further, only leaders expected a significantly higher probability of being sanctioned for violating their team’s monitoring norm (compared to the subordinates’ expectations). Even though norm violation in Study 1 was judged more harshly by non-leaders this did not translate to sanction expectations.
Thus, our findings provide insights regarding attitudes and norms about digital monitoring and (expected) consequences for a norm-contradictory implementation of those at the workplace. Our results suggest, that the implementation of digital monitoring technologies at the workplace violating established norms of monitoring acceptability is judged more harshly for leaders than non-leaders (colleagues). However, the general acceptability seems to be relatively coherent across hierarchy levels. Further, leaders seem to be rather more sensitive and reluctant to violate those norms.