13:30 - 15:10
Room: Club B
Chair/s:
Patrick Walkowiak
Discussant - Filippo Bignami 

Ersi Cha - Authoritarian Opportunity Structures and the Politics of Inequality: A Quasi-Experimental Analysis of Labor Contention in China
Liana Eustacia Reyes - Post-Conflict Constitution Making: Causes and Consequences for Peace
Dolunay Bulut - Constitutional Politics of Memory and Resentment: Tale of Two Autocracies
Jie Chen - Algorithmic Resistance of the “Platform Precariat” in China: Levels, Forms and Causes
Patrick Walkowiak - News for Sale? Ownership Changes in European News Outlets and Their Impact on Political Coverage (2010-2024)
Submission 58
Authoritarian Opportunity Structures and the Politics of Inequality: A Quasi-Experimental Analysis of Labor Contention in China
Panel.7-S-5
Presented by: Ersi Cha
Ersi Cha
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg
This paper examines how authoritarian political opportunity structures reproduce inequality by shaping labor protest outcomes in post-COVID China. Unlike conventional approaches that treat inequality as a socioeconomic outcome, this study conceptualizes it as a politically mediated process managed through selective repression, institutional closure, and controlled responsiveness. Employing a quasi-experimental, mixed-method design, it identifies causal mechanisms through which authoritarian institutions contain class-based contention.

The empirical analysis draws on a dataset of 6,451 labor protest events (2020–2025) from the China Labour Bulletin, including variables on size, sector, location, form, and resolution. Results show that protests in provinces with tighter local–business alignments and higher censorship are significantly less likely to achieve material concessions, even when grievances are comparable. This demonstrates that authoritarian regimes manage inequality through political containment rather than redistribution.

Complementing the quantitative analysis, qualitative discourse analysis of state media, policy documents, and online narratives shows how inequality is framed as an individual responsibility, depoliticizing class grievances. Together, the methods reveal a dual strategy: neutralizing political challenge while tactically addressing social discontent.

Comparatively, the study situates China’s governance of inequality alongside advanced democracies, where institutional openness coexists with elite capture and symbolic inclusion. Both regime types converge in protecting elite interests while constraining redistributive mobilization.

By providing design-based causal evidence, this study contributes to research on inequality and comparative authoritarianism, showing how political opportunity structures convert socioeconomic inequality into a depoliticized and managed condition. It also demonstrates the utility of mixed-method quasi-experimental designs for uncovering mechanisms of control across regime types.