A popular democratic state-building tool following armed conflict is constitution-making. However, there is little systematic analysis of the conditions under which this tool is used, how it varies, and whether it succeeds at promoting democratic stability. We argue that armed conflicts with greater international involvement are more likely to be followed by constitution-making. However, when this tool is influenced and designed by external international actors, ``top-down constitutions,'' we are more likely to observe greater provisions with monopolistic statutory law and boilerplate terms, specifically when it comes to rights provisions. Alternatively, constitutions drafted predominantly with internal actors, or from the ``bottom up,’’ will have less boilerplate language. We expect the latter set of constitutions to induce greater democratic stability. To examine our argument, we compile cross-national data on constitutions following a civil war from 1945-2015. This study will enhance our understanding of the causes and consequences of constitution-making processes for state-building and post-conflict stability.