European integration complicates the ability of governments to implement their policies as they wish, and results in a gradual loss of national sovereignty and identity, as delegating decision-making powers to the European Union (EU) blurs boundaries between nation-states. Consequently, individuals who uphold exclusive nationalism and prioritize representative democracy are more susceptible to the influence of populist radical right parties (PRRPs) and exhibit more skepticism toward the EU.

In semi-presidential democracies, the president may play a role in curbing populism and euroscepticism. Presidents may exercise formal or informal power to intervene in the executive affairs of government, leading to intra-executive conflicts. This may serve as an alternative delegation chain from the people to the government that can push for values or policy directions that are in line with what their citizens want. Therefore, intra-executive competition may alleviate euroscepticism among individuals with an exclusively national identity and a focus on representative democracy, thus reducing the proliferation of populist parties that employ anti-elitist rhetoric and speak on behalf of the ‘ordinary people’ for political cues.

This study confirms hypotheses using the data form Eurobarometer survey series and the European Election Voter Study. First, this study found that euroscepticism partially mediates the effect of intra-executive competition on the strength of PRRPs. Second, individuals with an exclusively national identity and a focus on representative democracy are less likely to regard the EU negatively and vote for PRRPs when intra-executive conflict occurs. In sum, intra-executive competition may thwart the populist surge by reducing euroscepticism.