13:30 - 15:10
Room: Club B
Chair/s:
Marli Fernandes
Semra Sevi, Can Mekik, André Blais - What Do Voters Want out of Elections?
Wen-Chin Lu - Countering the populist surge: intra-executive competition as a way to alleviate euroscepticism
Mert Kartal - Anti-Corruption Backlash: How Failed Anti-Corruption Efforts Fuel Right-Wing Populism in the EU
Ferdinando Lombardi Vallauri - Contesting the Green Deal: An Investigation of the Populist Narratives of Discontent Towards EU Climate Policies in Italy.
Marli Fernandes - Populism Contagion: Strategic Policy Responses to Populist Opponents
Submission 221
Anti-Corruption Backlash: How Failed Anti-Corruption Efforts Fuel Right-Wing Populism in the EU
Panel.7-S-3
Presented by: Mert Kartal
Mert Kartal
St. Lawrence University
The literature on right-wing populism often attributes the rise in support for anti-establishment parties to mainstream political actors' failure to address economic hardships or manage immigration effectively. This paper offers an alternative explanation focused on corruption control, presenting two mechanisms linking corruption to the growth of right-wing populist support in Europe. Firstly, populist actors exploit public frustration over the inability of mainstream policymakers, at both national and European levels, to achieve sustainable corruption control by adopting an anti-corruption stance aimed at fixing what "the establishment" has failed to address. Secondly, the European Union’s (EU) approach to corruption control unexpectedly contributes to this trend. The EU’s ineffective anti-corruption strategies, along with its inclination to attribute unfavorable outcomes to member states and their citizens, fuel nationalist sentiments that populist actors leverage through anti-EU rhetoric. Analyzing an original dataset on right-wing populist party support in national elections across 28 European countries since 1990, statistical findings indicate that rising corruption significantly drives support for populist parties. This effect is particularly pronounced in EU member states where corruption levels have increased, compared to non-members with a similar trajectory. The results suggest that the EU’s existing approach to corruption control not only fails to curb domestic corruption but also inadvertently boosts public approval for populist leaders. Qualitative analyses of Austria and Italy further substantiate these findings, indicating a causal link between the failure of mainstream actors, including the EU, to control corruption and the electorate's growing support for populist politicians.