We have witnessed increasing threats to judicial independence across numerous nations in the age of democratic backsliding. A critical mechanism within this phenomenon is executive aggrandizement, which frequently employs court curbing—the reduction of the judiciary's power and autonomy—thereby undermining vertical, diagonal, and horizontal accountability mechanisms. In South Korea, both incumbent and opposition parties have been observed attempting to formally and informally restrict the powers of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court. Public attitudes toward court curbing are pivotal for sustaining judicial legitimacy. However, the perceived value and legitimacy of the judiciary, alongside the willingness to defend its institutions, can be significantly influenced by partisanship. Drawing upon a survey experiment conducted in South Korea, this study examines the public’s partisan responses to an incumbent party’s court curbing efforts. The core hypotheses are as follows: (1) Individuals will perceive court curbing as more democratic when it is executed by their in-party compared to an opposing party. (2) Individuals will be more likely to agree with the court curbing measure when it is carried out by their in-party compared to an opposing party. The findings reveal a strong partisan reaction to in-party court curbing within South Korea. This outcome substantiates prior claims concerning the role of partisanship in shaping public attitudes toward high courts, while simultaneously underscoring the possibility that the Korean public may still hold the judiciary in a unique regard.