Recent research confirms the impact of constitutional rules and political circumstances on the survival of semi-presidential governments, but it is unclear how these factors relate to the longevity of minority governments. This research suggests that the lifespan of a minority government is determined by institutional (cabinet termination power) and non-institutional (parliamentary fragmentation, cohabitation and intra-executive competition, and political career) factors.

First, this research differentiates types of early government termination into early elections, endogenous collapse, and exogenous collapse. Second, the risk of a minority government failing due to exogenous collapse increases when the constitution grants the president and the parliament significant termination power. However, a higher level of parliamentary fragmentation diminishes the presidents’ readiness to exercise the dismissal power, thereby reducing its marginal effect on the risk of exogenous collapse. Third, the likelihood that minority governments will fail as a result of exogenous factors is increased by cohabitation and intra-executive competition; however, the relationship between intra-executive competition and the risk of exogenous collapse varies depending on the conflict issue. Fourth, the type of cabinet reshuffles is determined by the divergent political careers of the prime ministers.

This paper employs competing risk survival analysis and develops an index of cabinet termination power to confirm hypotheses for 20 semi-presidential democracies. This research concludes that a constitutional design that is effective in mitigating the risk of exogenous collapse should either decrease the likelihood of cohabitation or increase the power of the prime minister at the expense of the president and the parliament.