Contemporary political debates increasingly revolve around how constrained governments are in their policy making; some contend they are too constrained, others that they are not constrained enough, yet others that such constraints are being dismantled. In this paper I argue that while there is a substantial body of work relating to this topic, there is no coherent theory of what constraints on governments are and we have only an incomplete empirical mapping of it.

Drawing on Jon Elster’s work on precommitment, I develop a theory of formal constraints on government, defining these as rules that limit their options in decision-making and opportunities for decision-making. I distinguish between universal constraints (e.g. separation of powers, individual rights) and targeted constraints (e.g. re-allocation of policy authority, restrictions on policy instruments). While the former is thoroughly mapped empirically, I argue that the latter has been given a more disparate treatment.

I propose a strategy for measuring targeted constraints using quantitative text analysis of national and supranational legislation, and adopt this on competition, monetary, and trade policy for 20 Western countries 1975-2025. I further suggest how this measure can be combined with measures of universal constraints from V-Dem to provide a holistic measure of constraints. The descriptive evidence of targeted constraints in these areas suggest that government constraints on policy making has increased markedly over this period, and that only marginal dismantling has occurred. I conclude with a discussion of how this work paves the way for theorizing why constraints change over time.