What explains political parties’ broad embrace of monetarism and New Classical economics? Why did a substantial share of parties abandon the postwar commitment to full employment in favor of price stability? I argue that national experiences with inflation crises play a critical role in shaping parties’ macroeconomic orientations. Specifically, such crises erode public trust in government’s capacity to manage the economy effectively and foster a general aversion to activist fiscal and monetary policy. Voters also tend to attribute inflation crises to governments’ politically motivated use of expansionary measures. In response, they favor a reduced governmental role in macroeconomic management and support policy frameworks that prioritize price stability over broader interventionist goals. These political dynamics, reinforced by electoral incentives, induce parties across the ideological spectrum to converge on a more conservative macroeconomic stance, thereby institutionalizing a norm of monetary and fiscal restraint. Empirical analysis using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project and the World Values Survey shows that countries’ past experience with inflation crises—unlike other types of economic crises—significantly weakens public support for macroeconomic intervention and leads parties to adopt more conservative macroeconomic platforms.