The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), a product of Taiwan’s state-led developmental strategies under authoritarianism, is now the top producer of the most critical element for the growth of artificial intelligence (AI). Despite Taiwan’s crucial role in the megatrend of AI, little has been done to investigate the political struggles behind the economic and industrial policies (EIPs) that led to the state's choices of the key industries to develop. Specifically, most studies of the developmental states focus on the bureaucratic discretion, while few efforts have shown the parliamentary discourses over the EIPs and whether the political elites agree with the government. Moreover, it remains understudied whether and how electoral incentives account for the co-opted MPs’ preferences for the EIPs under authoritarianism. Through AI-collaborated text analyses of the MPs’ interpellations during Taiwan’s authoritarian era (1961-1992), this research explores the relationship between nominally democratic elections and the co-opted parliamentary elites’ stances over the EIPs. Since the EIPs create winner and losers, I argue that the MPs’ preferences for the EIPs vary with the MPs’ backgrounds and the characteristics of their constituencies. The MPs who were elected through district elections, who were from a local faction, who had served as a local representative and whose districts featured more protected industries might show stronger antagonism than others toward the progress of industrial transformation and changes of the EIPs. This research contributes important implications for studies of political economy under authoritarianism and how economic and political developments may be intertwined in a developing economy.