A defining premise of electoral democracy is that incumbents accept electoral defeat and allow successors to govern. Yet, in an increasing number of cases, executives signal or enact resistance to electoral outcomes, raising uncertainty about the peaceful transfer of power. While prior research examines punishment for electoral manipulation ex-post, we know little about whether voters respond before norms are violated, when the threat remains prospective. Do voters mobilize to defend democratic procedures, disengage, or adapt strategically based on partisan identity and electoral expectations?

To address these questions, we field a preregistered vignette experiment in the run up to Turkey’s 2024 local elections, a context marked by more than 150 removals of elected opposition mayors in the previous decade. Respondents were randomly assigned to scenarios signaling either a high likelihood of opposition mayors being removed following an opposition victory or no such signal. We then examine effects on turnout intentions and vote choices across partisan identities and electoral competitiveness.

Our findings show that voters respond to anticipated democratic norm violations, but in asymmetric ways. Opposition partisans facing likely post electoral removal withdraw from participation, reducing turnout without changing their partisan preferences. Regime partisans, in contrast, become more likely to vote and to support opposition candidates when the opposition is perceived as electorally viable, suggesting forward looking punishment of threatened democratic non-compliance. Nonpartisan respondents remain largely unaffected. These results demonstrate that expectations of institutional compliance, not only observed violations, shape voter behavior and democratic accountability.