11:20 - 13:00
Room: Meeting Room 2.1
Chair/s:
Joseph Klaver
Joseph Coll, Sean Freeder, Enrijeta Shino - In the Eye of the Beholder: Race, Resentment, and Electoral Perceptions
Joseph Klaver - Comparative Election Dispute Resolution: Institutional Variation and the Role of Accessibility and Partisanship
Amy Basu - Paying Voters: Electoral Handouts and Client Commitment
Verlan Lewis - Presidential Reputations and Unexpected Policy in American Politics
Submission 488
Presidential Reputations and Unexpected Policy in American Politics
Panel.2-S-4
Presented by: Verlan Lewis
Verlan Lewis
Utah Valley University
Formal models of voting often portray rational voters as casting presidential votes based on which candidate is closest to their ideal policy preference points. These models assume that voters care more about policy outcomes than a candidate’s character or leadership qualities (and that voters have, ex ante, ideal policy preference points that they can rationally compare with the ideal policy preference points signaled by candidates). This article asks whether ideological signals provided in the presidential campaign are predictive of legislation enacted. Surprisingly, this study finds that, of the 184 important American laws passed by Congress and signed by presidents from Bush 41 through Trump, the legislation actually moved public policy more often in the direction of the policy preferences signaled by the losing presidential candidate than the winner. As a result, voters should not prioritize ideological preference points over other important considerations when voting like character.