Although electoral issues, ranging from administration problems to electoral violence, are frequent occurrences throughout the world, there is little agreement about the best strategies for resolving any resultant disputes. The variety of strategies employed is evident in the wide variation in the institutional design of election dispute resolution institutions throughout the world. When it comes to legislative elections there is a wide array of practices. For example, some countries entrust this task to the regular court system, while others send these issues straight to that country's top court; many countries have also created special electoral courts or resolve the dispute within their election management body, and relatively few countries still resolve these disputes in the legislature itself. Across these broad institutional strategies, I argue that two aspects of institutional design are of particular importance: the partisanship of those making the decision and the accessibility of the dispute resolution institution to the voting public. Focusing on France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, I investigate the relationship between these design elements and the frequency of election disputes and cancelled elections. To do so, I conduct two analyses. First, I look at the frequency with which formal disputes are actually filed with formal institutions and how frequently these disputes lead to results actually being cancelled over the past several decades. Second, I focus on several recent electoral contests as qualitative case studies that are illustrative of the dispute resolution process in each of these countries.