The establishment of anti-money laundering (AML) regimes, such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), has long been justified as a necessary measure to crack down on illicit financial flows. While these regimes have achieved relatively high levels of compliance, their actual impact on altering patterns of money laundering remains largely debated. Given the high costs of compliance and the uncertain payoffs, an important question arises: why do countries choose to join these regimes? This paper argues that compliance with AML regulations is not primarily intended as a direct mechanism to curtail illicit activities but rather as a signal to private investors about the stability and credibility of a state's financial market. I examine this trend of compliance in the recent context of shifts away from the Western-dominated financial structure. Using a between-within random effects model, I examine the relationship between AML membership and foreign investment flows of varying maturities. The initial findings suggest that states prioritize AML compliance to attract foreign investment, even when the regulatory costs to their markets are significant.