This study investigates the relationship between voting rules and utilitarian outcomes, providing a comprehensive analysis of strategic voting dynamics. Under a utilitarian framework, the optimal choice maximizes total expected voter utility. Voters may express preferences sincerely—based on direct utility—or strategically—considering both utility and the likelihood of a choice winning.

Employing a novel computer simulation, this research systematically evaluates multiple majoritarian voting rules against the utilitarian criterion across varied electoral scenarios. In addition to examining the established form of strategic voting (that we call Type A), where voters support their second-preferred option to improve its chances of winning when their first preference has low prospects, the study introduces an additional dimension: Type B strategic voting. This alternative perspective examines scenarios in which voters manipulate their ballots to increase the probability of their most preferred option's success.

The findings illuminate critical trade-offs between strategic voting and utilitarian efficiency. Under plurality voting, Type A strategic behavior enhances utilitarian efficiency by up to 20%, aligning electoral outcomes more closely with aggregate voter utility. In contrast, Type B strategic voting, especially in systems like the Borda count, greatly increases strategic behavior—sometimes doubling it—exacerbating deviations from utilitarian choice.

By expanding the analytical scope of strategic voting, this study deepens our understanding of how voting rules influence voter behavior and collective outcomes. These insights contribute to the broader discourse on electoral system design, underscoring the complex interplay between sincerity, strategic behavior, and utilitarian efficiency.