In the complex landscape of modern conflicts, "militarized mediators"—external actors who fund and mediate disputes—pose a critical paradox with significant implications for conflict dynamics. This article examines the impact of these dual-role actors on conflict outcomes across 31 African countries, with detailed case studies. Utilizing the UCDP External Support Dataset for monetary support to rebel groups and the African Peace Processes Database for mediation efforts, the study analyzes mediator-rebel dyads through cross-sectional time series data. Employing Fixed Effects Panel Linear Regression, the first part assesses whether external funding from militarized mediators enhances their negotiating leverage compared to traditional mediators. The second part uses Cox proportional hazard models to predict the durability of peace following their involvement in peace agreements. The findings suggest that financial dependencies imposed by external supporters can constrain rebel groups' strategic options, potentially leading to quicker conflict resolutions but less durable peace. The dual role of militarized mediators can introduce conflicting interests, hindering effective peace agreement implementation. This study contributes to the rebel finance literature by highlighting the strategic limitations imposed by external funding and enriches peacebuilding literature by examining how mediators' financial interests influence conflict resolution efforts. The research enhances our understanding of the relationship between funding mechanisms and mediation effectiveness, paving the way for new avenues in conflict management and peacebuilding strategies.