How do states normalize the existence and usage of weapon systems, and what explains the variations among those processes? This study investigates middle powers’ normalization processes of weapon systems, related to their pursuit of status in the international order. Previous studies have struggled to explain the variations in these processes’ scope and objectives. This study emphasizes how the technical and normative characteristics of each weapon system, whether those qualify as 'superweapon’, affect middle powers' strategic frameworks—whether they adopt a governmental/national or supranational approach to normalizing the existence and usage of these weapons. The research sheds light on how middle powers approach the technological constructive power of weapon systems may contribute to peace. To substantiate this argument, the study conducts a comparative analysis of the normalization processes of nuclear weapons, lethal autonomous weapon systems, anti-personnel mines, and cluster munitions. Specifically, the research examines the Wellington Process (1985) for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific, the Hague Process (2023) on responsible AI in the military domain, the Ottawa Process (1997) for anti-personnel mine ban normalization, and the Oslo Process (2007) for cluster munitions ban normalization. These cases illustrate how middle powers are influenced by the technological constructive power of weapon systems—whether they are considered superweapons or not—in constructing strategic frameworks to normalize these systems. This study contributes by elucidating how middle powers' pursuit of status and their perceptions relate to their behavior. For policymakers, this research serves as a primer on explaining and predicting middle powers' approaches to further developments.