Democratic theory suggests that we should want politicians to take their policy instructions from citizens. However, this conception of democracy is challenged by evidence that voters are not knowledgeable about policy, that voters are short-sighted, and that voters do not hold anything like crystallized policy positions on most issues. This has led to an expansion of the concept of a healthy democracy to one in which politicians may “get out in front of” voters to achieve the politician’s preferred policy, while not subjecting themselves to electoral risk (Jacobs 2000; Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts 2001).
I add to these prior explanations. Under my account, a President making an unpopular policy choice can obtain their preferred policy outcome and avoid electoral calamity, even if voters do not change their ideal policy outcome before or after the President takes action. This is possible, I argue, because shifting the status quo may alter voters’ perceptions about the set of viable policy alternatives.
A key empirical implication of my theory is that voters’ acceptance of policy changes they disfavor will depend on their perceptions of the likely alternative to that outcome (if any). In spring 2025, I will field a panel survey to track voter reactions to the initiatives rolled out by the incoming presidential administration. Voters will be interviewed to gauge their approval of proposed new initiatives, reinterviewed to observe any over-time change in policy approval, and asked to share their beliefs about what they perceive to be the alternatives to the new policies.