13:10 - 14:50
P13-S317
Room: -1.A.07
Chair/s:
Alexander Kuo
Ad Machina: The Political Economy of Delegating Interest Rate Decision-Making to Artificial Intelligence
P13-S317-1
Presented by: Matthew DiGiuseppe
Matthew DiGiuseppe 1, Tobias Rommel 2, Andreas Kern 3
1 Leiden University
2 Technical University of Munich
3 Georgetown University
Under which conditions are citizens willing to delegate government tasks to artificial intelligence? Several studies examine how characteristics of the technology and individuals' relationship to technology impact support for AI policymaking. Our innovation is to examine how the identity of current policymakers impacts public support for delegating decisions to AI. In particular, we argue that in a highly polarized society, AI has the potential to serve as a 'non-partisan' decision maker that has the potential to bring apolitical motivations to government decisions. Following this line of thought, we reason that individuals will prefer co-partisans to AI decision making. However, AI decision making will have more public support when out-partisans hold policy control. To test our hypothesis, we fielded a survey in the summer of 2024 which asked respondents to register their support for AI making the most important economic decision in the world - the setting of the base interest rate by the US Federal Reserve. The basis of our experimental treatments is the fact that Jerome Powell, the current chair of the Federal Reserve, was appointed first by President Trump, a Republican, and later re-appointed by President Biden, a Democrat. Based on this setup, we hypothesize that when we inform respondents that Powell was appointed by Biden (Trump), support for AI delegation decreases (increases) among Democrats and increases (decreases) among Republicans. We find that support for an AI decision maker increases by 35% of a standard deviation when respondents are led to believe the Fed Chair is an out-partisan.
Keywords: AI, Central Banks, Polarization

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