Political congruence—the alignment between political actors and voters—is often considered biased in favor of wealthy and educated voters. Privileged groups are thought to wield greater influence over party and representative positions through mechanisms such as wealth and imbalances in descriptive representation. We challenge this conventional wisdom on both conceptual and theoretical grounds. Conceptually, we posit that previous findings of bias toward the wealthy and educated arose from examining the effects of income and education separately, thereby overlooking critical heterogeneity. Theoretically, we argue that parties positioning is driven by electoral competition dynamics and is independent of the influence of privileged voters. Parties position themselves to maximize votes. This is exemplified by party systems adjustments in response to the rising importance of cultural issues in the 1970s and 80s. We expect that before the transformation privileged and less privileged voters did not differ in their congruence levels. After the transformation, not privileged but voters with a low-income and longer education as well as voters with a high-income and shorter education should be most congruent. Empirically, we test our argument with a unique dataset covering five decades, 71 elections in total from 6 different countries. We find our expectations supported. Patterns of political congruence change over time and the most privileged are not the most congruent group.