Bullying buddy: How formal and informal allies withstand U.S. sanction pressure
P12-S303-4
Presented by: Gerald Schneider
The literature on economic sanctions suggests that powerful senders can “weaponize” asymmetries in networks of interdependence to coerce opposing states and reluctant allies into significant concessions. This article qualifies this assertion and conceives of economic sanctions in line with critiques of the pioneering contributions on “complex interdependence” as an implicit bargaining process in which the bargaining leverage of the sender and the target influences the onset and success of coercive measures. Differentiating between the relative power of formal and informal allies and other sanction targets, we expect that formal allies fall less frequently victim to sanctions than informal partners and non-allied states. The model suggests further that the sanctioner needs stronger measures against informal partners unless they are economically more powerful and less dependent on the sender. Powerful alliance partners have to grant more concessions than non-allied partners. The empirical analysis, which focuses on the sanctioning behavior of the U.S., the most prolific sender in the post-Cold War era, supports our conjectures. Selected case studies provide details on the decision-making processes.
Keywords: Sanctions, alliances, conflict, security, IPE