The Case Against Eternal Life: Why our leaders get older and the consequences thereof
P12-S291-3
Presented by: Jacob Nyrup
Since 1950, the average age of dictators has increased from 55 to 65 years, while the average age of democratic leaders has remained constant at around 55 years of age in the same period. This article argues that democratic institutions cause regular turnover of democratic leaders, resulting in their average age remaining the same. Yet, why are dictators, on average, getting older and older? I examine three competing explanations for this pattern. First, 1) aging, namely that medical advances cause dictators to live longer than they would have done previously, 2) a decline in the likelihood of removal due to dictators adopting better strategies for remaining in power, and 3) that dictators are getting older when they first enter power. The results indicate that the two first reasons are the better explanations. At last, the article discusses the potential consequences of this pattern, using both theoretical arguments, matching, and difference-in-difference methods. Overall, the article shows that this is a worrying pattern with grave consequences, such as lower growth, more repression, and more international conflicts. It also argues that the strengthening of democratic institutions is necessary to circumvent this development.
Keywords: Age, dictators, democracy, institutions, economic growth