In representative democracies, politicians are expected—and thus incentivised—to be responsive. However, studies show that politicians' responsiveness tends to be selective, with certain groups and issues receiving more attention than others. What drives politicians to prioritise certain public opinion signals while overlooking others? This study aims to explore a potential factor contributing to this phenomenon by examining the mechanisms through which politicians translate public preferences into political action. We posit that politicians will use certain criteria against which they test public opinion signals to determine their weight. Signals that are valued more positively will carry more weight and hence increase politicians’ willingness to act accordingly. Conversely, information that is negatively appraised is more likely to be disregarded, resulting in a smaller impact on politicians' behavior. Drawing on survey and interview data from politicians across 12 countries, we will examine what criteria politicians judge to be the most important when evaluating public opinion signals. Ultimately, the results of our study will give us a better understanding of how responsiveness comes about and why it sometimes falls short.