Does competition between great powers to attract investments shape UN votes? Recent research has examined how Chinese financing influences countries' political choices. However, few studies have focused on how investments in China and competition to attract or restrict such money flow affect countries' international stances.
This paper fills this gap by investigating how investments directed to China or the USA influence countries' voting behaviour on the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Investments make countries vulnerable to the recipients' political decisions, and these vulnerabilities might drive them to accommodate political stances. Yet, this is conditional to the major recipient. Countries align with the Chinese position at the UNGA if the most significant share is directed to China; conversely, they associate with Washington if the largest share is headed there.
We employ a large-N study that combines UNGA votes and investment stock in China and the US. Using logit analyses, we examine each vote between 2000 and 2018 to determine whether countries aligned with China's opposition to the US and vice versa. Our findings confirm our expectations, showing a robust correlation between the share of investment and vote alignment. Interestingly, regime type does not appear to moderate this effect.
Thus, this paper contributes to the debate on foreign investments and great power competition by adopting a point-of-view so far neglected. Indeed, it shows that, alongside investments from great powers, those directed to them are also important. As such, this article has important policy implications, helping policymakers better predict countries' behaviours at the UNGA.