This study explores how the absence of life tenure influences judicial decision-making, focusing on the tension between judicial independence and accountability in ordinary judiciaries. Provisional appointments, which place early-career judges in temporary roles, can undermine judicial independence and expose them to external pressures. These dynamics are further intensified in hierarchical judicial systems where career progression—appointments, promotions, and discipline—is controlled by higher courts.

The research investigates patterns of strategic behavior by analyzing the alignment between lower court decisions and the preferences of higher courts in non-routine cases where ideological considerations are significant. Focusing on Chilean cases from 2015 to 2024, the study explores how provisional tenure shapes judicial behavior through a strategic rational-choice model. The analysis also accounts for judicial characteristics (e.g., gender, age, and experience), case factors (e.g., topic, jurisdiction, and review scope), and political influences, offering a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics that influence judicial decision-making.

This study contributes to the understanding of how institutional arrangements, particularly tenure status, influence judges. By identifying patterns in judicial decision-making, it offers critical insights into the implications of provisional tenure for judicial independence and accountability, as well as the broader governance of justice systems. The findings aim to inform institutional reforms to enhance judicial effectiveness and safeguard judicial impartiality.