Political elites increasingly resort to attacking, insulting and mocking one another, contributing to a growing democratic deficit in contemporary democracies. The literature has primarily argued that such behavior results from strategic rational choice considerations, with opposition elites using attacks to discredit the government’s record. However, recent studies suggest that individual characteristics, such as personality traits, may also explain why political elites resort to attacks. As such, it remains unclear whether elites’ attacking behavior stems from their own rational calculus or their individual characteristics. In this study, we introduce a novel theoretical perspective, proposing that attack behavior results from strategic decisions moderated by individual characteristics, such as personality traits. To test this claim, we surveyed 145 elite politicians in Belgium and analyzed their attacks on other politicians via their personal Facebook pages. Our preliminary findings indicate that engaging in attack behavior is indeed influenced by strategic calculus; for instance, opposition politicians are more likely to attack than those in government. However, these effects are moderated by individual traits. For example, confident politicians in opposition are significantly more likely to engage in attacks compared to less confident opposing politicians. In conclusion, our research offers a new theoretical approach to understanding how strategic and individual factors shape elites’ attack behavior.