State capture by wealthy elites is a widespread phenomenon in developing democracies, yet the mechanisms through which it works and the impact it has on political and policy outcomes remain poorly understood. I develop an innovative, network-based approach to studying captured legislatures and argue that, in the context of a competitive political environment and weak rule of law, oligarchs defend their wealth by promoting as members of parliament individuals who are linked to them via interpersonal ties. Through their networks of loyal legislators, oligarchs influence the adoption of policies and decisions related to their economic interests, as well as policymaking more broadly. To develop and test these arguments, I rely on social network and regression analyses of original quantitative data and interview-based evidence on the case of Ukraine.

More specifically, I uncover the hidden networks of interpersonal connections between oligarchs and legislators by employing a network-based measurement strategy on 137 oligarchs and more than 800 legislators across two parliamentary convocations (2014-2019, 2019-2024) and utilizing unique administrative and investigative data. I then use regression analyses on roll-call voting data and expert-coded data on reforms to show that these oligarchic networks of loyal legislators push against anti-corruption reforms and influence legislative voting more broadly. The study has important implications for the literatures on money in politics, oligarchy, state capture, crony capitalism, political connections, neopatrimonialism, legislative politics, political parties, and political representation.