This study explores the critical role of political patronage in democratic backsliding, focusing on Hungary as a case study of autocratization in the European Union. It examines the transformation of political patronage from a common feature of democratic systems into a strategic tool for dismantling democracy and entrenching hybrid regimes. The study combines theoretical insights from studies of party politics, public administration, and democratization with empirical data on political appointments in Hungary since 1990. It argues that patronage becomes a mechanism for autocratization by neutralizing institutional checks, controlling key state functions, targeting political opponents, and diverting state resources to elite supporters.
Using original data on appointments to senior state secretary positions in Hungary’s central government ministries from 1990 to 2024, the study identifies distinct patterns of patronage before and after Viktor Orbán’s return to power in 2010. It distinguishes between an initiation phase of democratic regression, marked by rapid structural changes and control over critical institutions, and an entrenchment phase characterized by the consolidation of power through extensive clientelism and state capture. By demonstrating how patronage strategies evolve across these phases, the study provides a nuanced understanding of autocratic governance and its implications for democratic resilience.
The findings contribute to broader debates on democratic erosion, emphasizing the interplay between party politics, state administration, and regime transitions. Hungary’s trajectory offers lessons for both scholars and policymakers on the vulnerabilities of democratic institutions and the resilience required to safeguard them in the face of authoritarian threats.