Revolving door appointments—where politicians transition into private sector roles—are a global phenomenon with dual implications: they promise strategic value for firms while fueling public concerns about cronyism and \textit{quid pro quo} arrangements. This paper introduces a novel theoretical framework to distinguish between appointments motivated by a politician’s skills and connections and those perceived as political favors. Leveraging a unique dataset of over 100 appointments spanning two decades in Spain, a country where revolving doors are particularly controversial, the study examines the heterogeneous responses of financial markets and voters to these appointments. The findings highlight a stark divergence in perceptions. Financial markets respond positively to appointments seen as leveraging political expertise but react negatively to those perceived as politically motivated, reflecting concerns about inefficiencies and reputational risks. In contrast, voter reactions are predominantly negative, with announcements correlating with declines in trust in institutions such as political parties and parliament. Negative media coverage exacerbates these effects, revealing the critical role of public discourse. This paper makes two key contributions. First, it develops a new framework to understand the dual nature of revolving doors, offering nuanced insights into how financial markets evaluate political connections. Second, it pioneers an empirical investigation into voter reactions, expanding the literature’s scope to include the democratic consequences of revolving doors. By integrating financial and public perspectives, this study underscores the dual-edged nature of revolving doors, which enhance firm value under some conditions but erode public trust in governance and accountability.