Politicians regularly face policy decisions where they disagree with their constituents or some important portion of their constituency. In such situations, do politicians believe they can use the legislative process to diminish the electoral impact of unpopular policy outcomes? Few empirical works examine whether this is the case or applies to local government legislatures. In this paper, I examine the legislative process at the US municipal level and employ two surveys on elected municipal officials from across the US to better understand the local legislative process and test their perceptions of the electoral effects of different legislative tactics, using two separate vignette experiments. I find evidence that policymakers believe obfuscating procedures, and delegation in particular, can facilitate blame avoidance but may not always hinder credit-claiming, even among engaged voters who witness the legislative process unfold. More generally, I find that the legislative process is quite uniform across municipalities and perceived by local policymakers as being consequential to their reelection interests. This paper contributes to a small but growing literature that seeks to understand elected officials' perceptions of the electoral consequences of their actions, an important contribution to the study of democracy since major theories of legislative behavior and representation hinge on these rarely-measured perceptions of elected policymakers.